ONLINE APPENDIX

PEASANT RESISTANCE IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC AFFLUENCE: LESSONS FROM PARAGUAY

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Contents

A1 Additional Figures and Tables	A-2
A2 Robustness Checks	A-9
A3 Placebo Tests	A-34
A4 Extensions	A-53
A5 Additional Information on Interviews	A-57

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A1 Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Archival record from Última Hora, July 19, 2008.

Figure A2: Commodity prices by crop, 2000-2013.

Figure A3: Local regressions (LOESS) of peasant resistance on land suitability for each year of the period 2000-2013 period.

Figure A4: Settlements of subsistence agriculture (*núcleos*) in Paraguayan municipalities in 1990-1992.

Figure A5: Peasant committees in Paraguayan municipalities in 1992-1993.

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics.

Campesinos entran a una finca ajena y destruyen el maizal

Ocurrió en un establecimiento ubicado en Toro Pirú, departamento de San Pedro, porque pretenden que se les conceda tierras a 130 familias y que paren el uso de los agroquímicos que les daña, aducen.

s Marcelo Aq

por los ocupantes, mientras llegaban los efectivos policia-les de la zona. La propiedad cuenta con con del nal de G

de nuevo en qualquier

AMENAZA DE REINGRESO. Unos 50 efectivos policiales y el grupo de la Policía Montada

us bebés Benit

Se reinician ocupaciones



Figure A1: Archival record from Última Hora, July 19, 2008. The news article informs that nearly 200 peasants from the MCNOC occupied the TZ property (locted in Guayabí, San Pedro) and destroyed its corn fields in response to fumigations.



Figure A2: Commodity prices by crop, 1991-2017. Prices is the annual producer price of a metric ton of each of these crops in U.S. dollars. The red portions of the lines are the years of our period of study. Red dashed vertical lines indicate the first and last years of the period. The data come from FAOSTAT.



Figure A3: Local regressions (LOESS) of peasant resistance on land suitability for each year of the period 2000-2013. Peasant resistance is measured as the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) transformation of the number of events of peasant resistance to land encroachment. Land suitability is the IHS of the average metric tons of soybeans, maize, rice, and sugar per hectare. Red rug lines represent the distribution of municipalities for different levels of land suitability. Grey bands are 95% confidence intervals. The data come from *Última Hora*'s press archives and GAEZ.



Figure A4: Subsistence settlements (*núcleos*) in Paraguayan municipalities in 1990-1992. Municipalities with low levels of subsistence agriculture are those whose number of subsistence settlements is equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels of subsistence agriculture are those whose number of subsistence settlements is greater than its median value. The median value of subsistence settlements is 4. The data were provided by Guyrá Paraguay.



Figure A5: Peasant committees in Paraguayan municipalities in 1992-1993. Municipalities with low levels of organizational legacies are those whose number of peasant committees is equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels of organizational legacies are those whose number of peasant committees is greater than its median value. The median value for peasant committees is 1. The data come from Dávalos and Rodríguez (1994).

Peasant resistance 3122 0.16 0.47 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (no state) 3122 0.07 0.30 0.00 3.00 Peasant resistance (positive) 312 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 Peasant resistance (no Chaco) 3122 0.18 0.58 0.88 3.40 Peasant resistance (r-1) 3122 0.12 0.44 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (r-1) 3122 0.12 0.41 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.12 0.41 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (idiscrete) 3122 0.01 0.02 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (idiscrete) 3122 0.01 0.00 2.31 Conflict peasant-indigenous 3122 0.01 0.00 2.31 Conflict peasant-indigenous 3122 0.01 0.02 4.85 6.21 Land suitability glace 0.88 0.07 0.70 0.97 Commodity prices (placebo)<		Ν	Mean	Std.Dev	Min	Max
Peasant resistance (no state) 3122 0.07 0.30 0.00 3.20 Peasant resistance (no environment) 3122 0.13 0.03 0.00 3.26 Peasant resistance (positive) 391 1.28 0.58 0.88 3.40 Peasant resistance (no Chaco) 3122 0.13 0.42 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (t-2) 3122 0.12 0.41 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.12 0.41 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.26 1.04 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (income) 3122 0.01 0.012 0.00 2.31 Conflict peasant-indigenous 3122 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.82 Commodity prices 3122 0.87 0.14 0.60 1.15 Land suitability 3122 0.87 0.14 0.60 1.15 Soybean price 3122 5.86 0.57 4.24 <	Peasant resistance	3122	0.16	0.47	0.00	3.40
Peasant resistance (no environment) 3122 0.15 0.46 0.00 3.26 Peasant resistance (binary) 3122 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 Peasant resistance (no Chaco) 3122 0.18 0.51 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (no Chaco) 3122 0.13 0.42 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (1-3) 3122 0.12 0.41 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.26 1.04 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (income) 3122 0.01 0.02 2.00 3.00 Conflict peasant-indigenous 3122 0.01 0.02 2.00 3.00 Commodity prices 3122 0.87 0.14 0.60 1.15 Soybean price 3122 0.87 0.14 0.60 1.15 Soybean price 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Maice price 3122 5.8 0.47 3.01 4.50	Peasant resistance (no state)	3122	0.07	0.30	0.00	3.00
Peasant resistance (pointive) 391 1.28 0.58 0.88 3.40 Peasant resistance (no Chaco) 3122 0.13 0.45 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (t-1) 3122 0.13 0.42 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (t-2) 3122 0.13 0.42 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.12 0.41 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (income) 3122 0.03 0.22 0.00 3.00 Conflict landowner-state 3122 0.01 0.09 0.00 2.31 Conflict peasant-indigenous 3122 0.60 0.42 4.85 6.21 Land suitability 3122 0.88 0.70 7.70 0.97 Commodity prices (placebo) 3122 5.86 0.57 4.24 6.43 Maize price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Soybean suitability 3122 0.88 0.66 0.97 <	Peasant resistance (no environment)	3122	0.15	0.46	0.00	3.26
Peasant resistance (no Chaco) 312 0.18 0.51 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (no Chaco) 3122 0.13 0.51 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (t-1) 3122 0.13 0.42 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.12 0.41 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.26 1.04 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (income) 3122 0.01 0.09 0.00 2.31 Conflict peasant-indigenous 3122 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.82 Commodity prices 3122 5.69 0.42 4.85 6.21 Land suitability 3122 0.87 0.14 0.60 1.15 Soybean price 3122 5.86 0.57 4.24 6.43 Maize price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Maize price 3122 0.88 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability <td>Peasant resistance (binary)</td> <td>3122</td> <td>0.13</td> <td>0.33</td> <td>0.00</td> <td>1.00</td>	Peasant resistance (binary)	3122	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
Peasant resistance (no Chaco) 3122 0.18 0.51 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (t-1) 3122 0.12 0.41 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.12 0.41 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.02 0.00 3.00 Conflict peasant-indigenous 3122 0.01 0.09 0.00 2.31 Conflict pasant-indigenous 3122 0.01 0.02 0.01 1.82 Commodity prices 3122 5.69 0.42 4.85 6.21 Land suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.70 0.97 Commodity prices 3122 5.66 0.42 4.42 6.19 Land suitability (placebo) 3122 5.86 0.37 4.24 6.43 Maize price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Soybean suitability 3122 0.88 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability	Peasant resistance (positive)	391	1.28	0.58	0.88	3.40
Peasant resistance (t-1) 3122 0.15 0.45 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (t-2) 3122 0.11 0.42 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.26 1.04 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (income) 3122 0.03 0.22 0.00 3.00 Conflict peasant-indigenous 3122 0.01 0.09 0.00 2.31 Conflict landowner-state 3122 0.68 0.07 0.70 0.97 Commodity prices (placebo) 3122 5.69 0.42 4.42 6.19 Land suitability (placebo) 3122 0.87 0.14 0.60 1.15 Soybean price 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Maize price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Sugar price 3122 0.88 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.67 0.07 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 </td <td>Peasant resistance (no Chaco)</td> <td>3122</td> <td>0.18</td> <td>0.51</td> <td>0.00</td> <td>3.40</td>	Peasant resistance (no Chaco)	3122	0.18	0.51	0.00	3.40
Peasant resistance (t-2) 3122 0.13 0.42 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.12 0.41 0.00 15.00 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.01 0.09 0.00 2.31 Conflict peasant-indigenous 3122 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.82 Commodity prices 3122 5.69 0.42 4.85 6.21 Land suitability 3122 5.66 0.42 4.42 6.19 Land suitability (placebo) 3122 5.66 0.42 4.42 6.43 Maize price 3122 5.66 0.77 4.24 6.43 Rice price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Sugar price 3122 0.88 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.67 0.00 1.02 </td <td>Peasant resistance (t-1)</td> <td>3122</td> <td>0.15</td> <td>0.45</td> <td>0.00</td> <td>3.40</td>	Peasant resistance (t-1)	3122	0.15	0.45	0.00	3.40
Peasant resistance (t-3) 3122 0.12 0.41 0.00 3.40 Peasant resistance (discrete) 3122 0.26 1.04 0.00 3.00 Conflict peasant-indigenous 3122 0.01 0.09 0.00 2.31 Conflict landowner-state 3122 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.82 Commodity prices 3122 0.88 0.07 0.70 0.97 Commodity prices (placebo) 3122 5.66 0.42 4.42 6.19 Land suitability (placebo) 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Rice price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.82 Maize price 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3	Peasant resistance (t-2)	3122	0.13	0.42	0.00	3.40
Peasant resistance (income) 3122 0.26 1.04 0.00 15.00 Peasant resistance (income) 3122 0.03 0.22 0.00 3.00 Conflict landowner-state 3122 0.01 0.02 0.00 1.82 Commodity prices 3122 5.69 0.42 4.85 6.21 Land suitability 3122 5.06 0.42 4.42 6.19 Land suitability (placebo) 3122 5.06 0.42 4.42 6.19 Land suitability (placebo) 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Maize price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Soybean suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 7 9.7 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.13 0.52 1.02 Rice suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.48 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 </td <td>Peasant resistance (t-3)</td> <td>3122</td> <td>0.12</td> <td>0.41</td> <td>0.00</td> <td>3.40</td>	Peasant resistance (t-3)	3122	0.12	0.41	0.00	3.40
Peasant resistance (income) 3122 0.03 0.22 0.00 2.31 Conflict peasant-indigenous 3122 0.01 0.09 0.00 2.31 Conflict landowner-state 3122 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.82 Commodity prices 3122 5.69 0.42 4.85 6.21 Land suitability 3122 5.06 0.42 4.42 6.19 Land suitability (placebo) 3122 5.66 0.42 4.42 6.43 Maize price 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Maize price 3122 5.87 0.52 5.34 6.24 Sugar price 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements <	Peasant resistance (discrete)	3122	0.26	1.04	0.00	15.00
Conflict peasant-indigenous 3122 0.01 0.09 0.00 2.31 Conflict landowner-state 3122 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.82 Commodity prices 3122 5.69 0.42 4.85 6.21 Land suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.70 0.97 Commodity prices 0.122 0.87 0.14 0.60 1.15 Soybean price 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Rice price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Sugar price 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122	Peasant resistance (income)	3122	0.03	0.22	0.00	3.00
Conflict landowner-state 3122 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.82 Commodity prices 3122 5.69 0.42 4.85 6.21 Land suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.70 0.97 Commodity prices placebo) 3122 5.06 0.42 4.42 6.19 Land suitability (placebo) 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Maize price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Sugar price 3122 0.88 0.47 3.01 4.50 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 1.02 Rice suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.69 6.23 0.00 1.00 Peasant committee	Conflict peasant-indigenous	3122	0.01	0.09	0.00	2.31
Commodity prices 3122 5.69 0.42 4.85 6.21 Land suitability 3122 5.06 0.42 4.42 6.19 Land suitability (placebo) 3122 5.06 0.42 4.42 6.19 Land suitability (placebo) 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Maize price 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Maize price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Sugar price 3122 0.88 0.07 0.07 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1	Conflict landowner-state	3122	0.01	0.12	0.00	1.82
Land suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.70 0.97 Commodity prices (placebo) 3122 5.06 0.42 4.42 6.19 Land suitability (placebo) 3122 0.87 0.14 0.60 1.15 Soybean price 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Maize price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.43 Sugar price 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.13 0.52 1.02 Rice suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 0.95 Subsistence settlements 3122 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q)	Commodity prices	3122	5.69	0.42	4.85	6.21
Commodity prices (placebo) 3122 5.06 0.42 4.42 6.19 Land suitability (placebo) 3122 0.87 0.14 0.60 1.15 Soybean price 3122 6.18 0.47 5.34 6.82 Maize price 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Rice price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Sugar price 3122 3.58 0.47 3.01 4.50 Soybean suitability 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 0.95 Subsistence settlements 3122 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3122 0.40 0.40 1.00 Subsistence settlements (algorete) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3122 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00	Land suitability	3122	0.88	0.07	0.70	0.97
Land suitability (placebo) 3122 0.87 0.14 0.60 1.15 Soybean price 3122 6.18 0.47 5.34 6.82 Maize price 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Rice price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Sugar price 3122 0.88 0.47 3.01 4.50 Soybean suitability 3122 0.88 0.47 3.01 4.50 Soybean suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 0.95 Subsistence settlements 3122 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.69 6.23 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q)	Commodity prices (placebo)	3122	5.06	0.42	4.42	6.19
Soybean price 3122 6.18 0.47 5.34 6.82 Maize price 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Rice price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Sugar price 3122 3.58 0.47 3.01 4.50 Soybean suitability 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.13 0.52 1.02 Rice suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 0.95 Subsistence settlements 3122 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (discrete)	Land suitability (placebo)	3122	0.87	0.14	0.60	1.15
Maize price 3122 5.66 0.57 4.24 6.43 Rice price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Sugar price 3122 3.58 0.47 3.01 4.50 Soybean suitability 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.13 0.52 1.02 Rice suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.69 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements	Soybean price	3122	6.18	0.47	5.34	6.82
Rice price 3122 5.87 0.32 5.34 6.24 Sugar price 3122 3.58 0.47 3.01 4.50 Soybean suitability 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.13 0.52 1.02 Rice suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 0.95 Subsistence settlements 3122 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements ($3Q$) 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees ($1Q$) 3122 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees ($3Q$) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees ($discrete$) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.27 </td <td>Maize price</td> <td>3122</td> <td>5.66</td> <td>0.57</td> <td>4.24</td> <td>6.43</td>	Maize price	3122	5.66	0.57	4.24	6.43
Sugar price 3122 3.58 0.47 3.01 4.50 Soybean suitability 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.13 0.52 1.02 Rice suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 0.95 Subsistence settlements 3122 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 6.09 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 1.00 <td< td=""><td>Rice price</td><td>3122</td><td>5.87</td><td>0.32</td><td>5.34</td><td>6.24</td></td<>	Rice price	3122	5.87	0.32	5.34	6.24
Soybean suitability 3122 0.88 0.08 0.67 0.97 Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.13 0.52 1.02 Rice suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 0.95 Subsistence settlements 3122 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (1Q) 3122 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 6.09 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 77.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 </td <td>Sugar price</td> <td>3122</td> <td>3.58</td> <td>0.47</td> <td>3.01</td> <td>4.50</td>	Sugar price	3122	3.58	0.47	3.01	4.50
Maize suitability 3122 0.88 0.13 0.52 1.02 Rice suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 0.95 Subsistence settlements 3122 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (1Q) 3122 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 6.09 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 77.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 IBR colonies 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00	Soybean suitability	3122	0.88	0.08	0.67	0.97
Rice suitability 3122 0.88 0.06 0.49 0.93 Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 0.95 Subsistence settlements 3122 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (3Q) 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (1Q) 3122 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 6.09 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 77.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Deasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.05 0.25 0.00 2.31 Evictions (families) 3062 0.17 0.98 0.00 8.71 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50 0.00 12.60 Planted soybean (2008-1991) <td>Maize suitability</td> <td>3122</td> <td>0.88</td> <td>0.13</td> <td>0.52</td> <td>1.02</td>	Maize suitability	3122	0.88	0.13	0.52	1.02
Sugar suitability 3122 0.88 0.07 0.00 0.95 Subsistence settlements 3122 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (3Q) 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (1Q) 3122 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 6.09 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 77.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Cotton farms 3010 0.27 0.44 0.00	Rice suitability	3122	0.88	0.06	0.49	0.93
Subsistence settlements 3122 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements $(1Q)$ 3122 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements $(3Q)$ 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees $(1Q)$ 3122 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees $(3Q)$ 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 6.09 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 77.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 IBR colonies 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (procedures) 3122 0.05 0.25 0.00 2.31 Evictions (families) 3062 0.17 0.98 0.00 8.71 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50 0.00 12.60 Planted soybean (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 10.14 Planted rice (Sugar suitability	3122	0.88	0.07	0.00	0.95
Peasant committees 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (3Q) 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (1Q) 3122 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 6.09 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 77.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Cotton farms 3010 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (procedures) 3122 0.05 0.25 0.00 2.31 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50	Subsistence settlements	3122	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00
Subsistence settlements (1Q) 3122 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (3Q) 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (1Q) 3122 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 6.09 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 77.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Cotton farms 3010 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (procedures) 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (families) 3062 0.17 0.98 0.00 8.71 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50 0.00 12.60 Planted soybean (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 10.14 Planted maize (2008-1991) 2828 -0.36 2.99 -6.51 9.34 Planted sugar	Peasant committees	3010	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
Subsistence settlements (3Q) 3010 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (1Q) 3122 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 6.09 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 77.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Cotton farms 3010 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 IBR colonies 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (procedures) 3122 0.05 0.25 0.00 2.31 Evictions (families) 3062 0.17 0.98 0.00 8.71 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50 0.00 12.60 Planted soybean (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 10.14 Planted maize (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 10.14 Planted sugar (2008-1991) 2828 -1.01 4.88 -8.19 9.31 Distance 3122 <	Subsistence settlements (1Q)	3122	0.69	0.46	0.00	1.00
Peasant committees (1Q) 3122 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 6.09 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 77.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Cotton farms 3010 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 IBR colonies 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 Evictions (procedures) 3122 0.05 0.25 0.00 2.31 Evictions (families) 3062 0.17 0.98 0.00 8.71 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50 0.00 12.03 Planted soybean (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 <td>Subsistence settlements $(3Q)$</td> <td>3010</td> <td>0.53</td> <td>0.50</td> <td>0.00</td> <td>1.00</td>	Subsistence settlements $(3Q)$	3010	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
Peasant committees (3Q) 3010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 6.09 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 77.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Cotton farms 3010 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 IBR colonies 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (procedures) 3122 0.05 0.25 0.00 2.31 Evictions (families) 3062 0.17 0.98 0.00 8.71 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50 0.00 12.03 Planted soybean (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 10.14 Planted maize (2008-1991) 2828 -0.36 2.99 -6.	Peasant committees (1Q)	3122	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00
Subsistence settlements (discrete) 3122 6.09 6.23 0.00 38.00 Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 77.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Cotton farms 3010 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 IBR colonies 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (procedures) 3122 0.05 0.25 0.00 2.31 Evictions (families) 3062 0.17 0.98 0.00 8.71 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50 0.00 12.60 Planted soybean (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 10.14 Planted rice (2008-1991) 2828 -0.36 2.99 -6.51 9.34 Planted rice (2008-1991) 2828 -1.01 4.88 -8.19 9.31 Distance 3122 94.84 66.08 1.53 507.84 Untitled farmland 2884 7.74 7.09 0.00 49.77 Ponulation 3122 10.18 1.02 7.53 13.25	Peasant committees (3Q)	3010	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
Peasant committees (discrete) 3010 4.76 10.20 0.00 77.00 Subsistence settlements (hectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Cotton farms 3010 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 IBR colonies 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (procedures) 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (families) 3062 0.17 0.98 0.00 8.71 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50 0.00 12.60 Planted soybean (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 10.14 Planted maize (2008-1991) 2828 -0.36 2.99 -6.51 9.34 Planted sugar (2008-1991) 2828 -1.01 4.88 -8.19 9.31 Distance 3122 94.84 66.08 1.53 507	Subsistence settlements (discrete)	3122	6.09	0.23	0.00	38.00
Subsistence settlements (nectares) 3122 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Cotton farms 3010 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 IBR colonies 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Evictions (procedures) 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (families) 3062 0.17 0.98 0.00 8.71 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50 0.00 12.60 Planted soybean (2008-1991) 2828 3.31 5.59 -9.30 12.03 Planted maize (2008-1991) 2828 -0.36 2.99 -6.51 9.34 Planted sugar (2008-1991) 2828 -1.01 4.88 -8.19 9.31 Distance 3122 94.84 66.08 1.53 507.84 Untitled farmland 2884 7.74 7.09 0.00 49.77 Population 3122 10.18 1.02 7.53 13.25	Peasant committees (discrete)	3010	4.76	10.20	0.00	//.00
Peasant committees (members) 2982 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 Cotton farms 3010 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 IBR colonies 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (procedures) 3122 0.05 0.25 0.00 2.31 Evictions (families) 3062 0.17 0.98 0.00 8.71 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50 0.00 12.60 Planted soybean (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 10.14 Planted maize (2008-1991) 2828 -0.36 2.99 -6.51 9.34 Planted sugar (2008-1991) 2828 -1.01 4.88 -8.19 9.31 Distance 3122 94.84 66.08 1.53 507.84 Untitled farmland 2884 7.74 7.09 0.00 49.77	Subsistence settlements (hectares)	3122	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
IBR colonies 3122 0.40 0.44 0.00 1.00 IBR colonies 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (procedures) 3122 0.05 0.25 0.00 2.31 Evictions (families) 3062 0.17 0.98 0.00 8.71 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50 0.00 12.60 Planted soybean (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 10.14 Planted maize (2008-1991) 2828 -0.36 2.99 -6.51 9.34 Planted sugar (2008-1991) 2828 -1.01 4.88 -8.19 9.31 Distance 3122 94.84 66.08 1.53 507.84 Untitled farmland 2884 7.74 7.09 0.00 49.77 Population 3122 10.18 1.02 7.53 13.25	Peasant committees (members)	2982	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Landowner associations 3122 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 Landowner associations 3122 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 Evictions (procedures) 3122 0.05 0.25 0.00 2.31 Evictions (families) 3062 0.17 0.98 0.00 8.71 Evictions (hectares) 3075 0.28 1.50 0.00 12.60 Planted soybean (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 10.14 Planted maize (2008-1991) 2828 -0.36 2.99 -6.51 9.34 Planted sugar (2008-1991) 2828 -1.01 4.88 -8.19 9.31 Distance 3122 94.84 66.08 1.53 507.84 Untitled farmland 2884 7.74 7.09 0.00 49.77	LDD colorias	2122	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
Evictions (procedures)31220.270.430.001.00Evictions (procedures)31220.050.250.002.31Evictions (families)30620.170.980.008.71Evictions (hectares)30750.281.500.0012.60Planted soybean (2008-1991)28283.315.59-9.3012.03Planted maize (2008-1991)2828-3.525.66-8.9310.14Planted rice (2008-1991)2828-0.362.99-6.519.34Planted sugar (2008-1991)2828-1.014.88-8.199.31Distance312294.8466.081.53507.84Untitled farmland28847.747.090.0049.77Population312210.181.027.5313.25	Landowner associations	3122	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00
Evictions (procedures)51220.030.230.002.31Evictions (families)30620.170.980.008.71Evictions (hectares)30750.281.500.0012.60Planted soybean (2008-1991)28283.315.59-9.3012.03Planted maize (2008-1991)2828-3.525.66-8.9310.14Planted rice (2008-1991)2828-0.362.99-6.519.34Planted sugar (2008-1991)2828-1.014.88-8.199.31Distance312294.8466.081.53507.84Untitled farmland28847.747.090.0049.77Population312210.181.027.5313.25	Existing (magaduma)	2122	0.27	0.45	0.00	1.00
Evictions (rainnes)50020.170.980.008.71Evictions (hectares)30750.281.500.0012.60Planted soybean (2008-1991)28283.315.59-9.3012.03Planted maize (2008-1991)2828-3.525.66-8.9310.14Planted rice (2008-1991)2828-0.362.99-6.519.34Planted sugar (2008-1991)2828-1.014.88-8.199.31Distance312294.8466.081.53507.84Untitled farmland28847.747.090.0049.77Population312210.181.027.5313.25	Evictions (procedures)	3122	0.05	0.23	0.00	2.51
Planted soybean (2008-1991) 2828 3.31 5.59 -9.30 12.03 Planted maize (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 10.14 Planted rice (2008-1991) 2828 -0.36 2.99 -6.51 9.34 Planted sugar (2008-1991) 2828 -1.01 4.88 -8.19 9.31 Distance 3122 94.84 66.08 1.53 507.84 Untitled farmland 2884 7.74 7.09 0.00 49.77 Population 3122 10.18 1.02 7.53 13.25	Evictions (hasteres)	2075	0.17	0.90	0.00	0./1
Planted solution (2008-1991) 2828 5.51 5.59 -9.50 12.05 Planted maize (2008-1991) 2828 -3.52 5.66 -8.93 10.14 Planted rice (2008-1991) 2828 -0.36 2.99 -6.51 9.34 Planted sugar (2008-1991) 2828 -1.01 4.88 -8.19 9.31 Distance 3122 94.84 66.08 1.53 507.84 Untitled farmland 2884 7.74 7.09 0.00 49.77 Population 3122 10.18 1.02 7.53 13.25	Planted soybean (2008-1001)	2828	0.20	5 50	0.00	12.00
Planted mal2 (2008-1991) 2828 -9.52 5.00 -8.93 10.14 Planted rice (2008-1991) 2828 -0.36 2.99 -6.51 9.34 Planted sugar (2008-1991) 2828 -1.01 4.88 -8.19 9.31 Distance 3122 94.84 66.08 1.53 507.84 Untitled farmland 2884 7.74 7.09 0.00 49.77 Population 3122 10.18 1.02 7.53 13.25	$\frac{1}{2000}$	2828	3.51	5.66	-9.30 8.03	12.03
Planted fuer (2008-1991) 2828 -0.30 2.99 -0.51 9.34 Planted sugar (2008-1991) 2828 -1.01 4.88 -8.19 9.31 Distance 3122 94.84 66.08 1.53 507.84 Untitled farmland 2884 7.74 7.09 0.00 49.77 Population 3122 10.18 1.02 7.53 13.25	Planted rice $(2008-1991)$	2020	-3.52	2.00	-0.95	0.34
Distance 3122 94.84 66.08 1.53 507.84 Untitled farmland 2884 7.74 7.09 0.00 49.77 Population 3122 10.18 1.02 7.53 13.25	Planted sugar $(2008-1991)$	2020 2828	-0.50	2.99 /1 88	-0.31	9.54
Untitled farmland 2884 7.74 7.09 0.00 49.77 Population 3122 10.18 1.02 7.53 13.25	Distance	2020	-1.01 Q/ Q/	00. ب ۵۸ ۸۵	-0.19	507 81
Population 3122 10.18 1.02 7.53 13.25	Untitled farmland	2881	771	7 00	0.00	<u>4</u> 0 77
	Population	3122	10.18	1.02	7 53	13 25

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

A2 Robustness Checks

Table A2: Excluding Conflicts with the Police.

Figure A6: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability (excluding conflicts with the police).

Figure A7: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with and without subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies (excluding conflicts with the police).

Table A3: Excluding Environmental Conflicts.

Figure A8: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability (excluding environmental conflicts).

Figure A9: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with and without subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies (excluding environmental conflicts).

Table A4: Alternative Measures of the Dependent Variable.

Table A5: Excluding Municipalities from the Chaco Region.

Figure A10: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability (excluding municipalities from the Chaco Region).

Figure A11: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with and without subsistence settlements and peasant committee (excluding municipalities from the Chaco Region).

Table A6: Alternative Base Regression Models.

Table A7: Alternative Cutoffs of Organizational Resources (1st and 3rd Quantiles).

Figure A12: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with and without subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies (1st quantile)

Figure A13: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with and without subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies (3rd quantile)

Table A8: Discrete Measures of Organizational Resources.

Table A9: Subsistence Hectares and Committee Members as Moderators.

Figure A14: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with and without subsistence agriculture (hectares) and organizational legacies (members).

Figure A15: Binning estimates of the marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability (Table 1).

Table A10: Binning Estimates by Land Suitability (Table 1).

Table A11: Split-Sample Interactions by Subsistence Agriculture and Organizational Legacies.

Figure A16: Binning estimates of the marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies.

Table A12: Binning Estimates by Land Suitability and Subsistence Agriculture.

Table A13: Binning Estimates by Land Suitability and Organizational Legacies.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Commodity prices	0.566**	0.474**	0.177	-0.357*	0.083	-0.088
	(0.224)	(0.226)	(0.355)	(0.187)	(0.163)	(0.203)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-0.565**	-0.556**	-0.134	0.324	-0.091	-0.008
	(0.241)	(0.246)	(0.385)	(0.210)	(0.172)	(0.205)
Commodity prices × Settlements			0.778*	1.502***		
• •			(0.434)	(0.326)		
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Settlements			-0.852^{*}	-1.638***		
			(0.472)	(0.354)		
Commodity prices × Committees					1.220***	0.863**
					(0.446)	(0.359)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Committees					-1.244**	-0.863**
					(0.486)	(0.391)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3122	2884	3122	2884	3010	2884
Adj. R-squared	-0.033	-0.038	-0.031	-0.030	-0.014	-0.030

Table A2: Excluding Conflicts with the Police

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. The dependent variable are all the events of peasant resistance that are not between peasants or indigenous peoples and police forces. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01



Figure A6: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance (excluding conflicts with the police) by land suitability. Based on model 1 (Table A2). The histogram represents the distribution of municipalities at different levels of land suitability. Red bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

(b) Peasant committees



Figure A7: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance (excluding conflicts with the police) by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies. Based on models 3 and 5 (Table A2). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are greater than its median value. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Commodity prices	1.181***	1.054***	0.602	0.057	0.744*	0.457
• •	(0.301)	(0.348)	(0.400)	(0.321)	(0.414)	(0.368)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-1.252***	-1.273***	-0.632	-0.242	-0.803*	-0.663
	(0.326)	(0.372)	(0.432)	(0.368)	(0.435)	(0.408)
Commodity prices × Settlements			1.232**	1.827***	. ,	. ,
			(0.587)	(0.638)		
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Settlements			-1.307**	-1.955***		
			(0.643)	(0.698)		
Commodity prices × Committees					1.155*	1.007
					(0.678)	(0.672)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Committees					-1.223	-1.068
					(0.746)	(0.736)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	3122	2884	3122	2884	3010	2884
Adj. R-squared	-0.037	-0.039	-0.033	-0.031	-0.032	-0.037

Table A3: Excluding Environmental Conflicts

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. The dependent variable are all the events of peasant resistance that are not environmental conflicts (e.g., deforestation or agrochemicals). *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01



Figure A8: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance (excluding environmental conflicts) by land suitability. Based on model 1 (Table A3). The histogram represents the distribution of municipalities at different levels of land suitability. Red bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

(b) Peasant committees



Figure A9: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance (excluding environmental conflicts) by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies. Based on models 3 and 5 (Table A3). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are greater than its median value. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

	Binary	Binary	Positive	Positive
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Commodity prices	3.935***	3.900**	1.807*	0.642
	(1.298)	(1.863)	(0.978)	(1.121)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-4.511***	-5.194***	-1.649	-0.985
	(1.484)	(1.805)	(1.097)	(1.233)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	3122	2884	391	350
Adj. R-squared			-0.219	-0.271

Table A4: Alternative Measures of the Dependent Variable

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. Models 1-2 are probit regression models. Models 3-4 are OLS models. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Commodity prices	1.594***	1.452***	0.881*	0.119	0.787**	0.555
• •	(0.374)	(0.417)	(0.527)	(0.309)	(0.378)	(0.395)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-1.736***	-1.721***	-0.988*	-0.335	-0.908**	-0.770^{*}
	(0.406)	(0.471)	(0.572)	(0.328)	(0.401)	(0.413)
Commodity prices \times Settlements	. ,		1.354*	2.339***	. ,	. ,
v 1			(0.724)	(0.635)		
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Settlements			-1.408^{*}	-2.472***		
			(0.788)	(0.691)		
Commodity prices \times Committees			. ,		1.706**	1.322**
					(0.736)	(0.672)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Committees					-1.789**	-1.378^{*}
					(0.804)	(0.734)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3010	2842	3010	2842	2954	2842
Adj. R-squared	-0.007	-0.015	-0.001	-0.001	0.004	-0.011

Table A5: Excluding Municipalites from the Chaco Region

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. The number of observations excludes all the municipalities from the Chaco rainforest in the western region of the country. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01



Figure A10: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability (excluding municipalities from the Chaco Region). Based on model 1 (Table A5). The histogram represents the distribution of municipalities at different levels of land suitability. Red bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

(b) Peasant committees



Figure A11: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies (excluding municipalities from the Chaco Region). Based on models 3 and 5 (Table A5). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are greater than its median value. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

	FE	FE	RE	RE	AR	AR	Tobit	Tobit	NB	NB
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Commodity prices	1.382^{***}	1.331^{***}	1.395^{***}	1.396^{***}	0.923^{**}	1.046^{**}	6.404^{***}	6.901^{***}	6.597***	2.330^{***}
Land suitability	(0.367) 7.144***	(0.389) 7.893***	(0.399) 7.142***	(0.421) 7.807***	(0.463) 4.989*	(0.474) 5.976**	(1.700) 29.952***	(1.943) 38.004***	(1.733)	(0.669)
×	(2.163)	(2.332)	(2.069)	(2.270)	(2.696)	(2.776)	(11.285)	(12.824)		
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-1.492^{***}	-1.491^{***}	-1.492^{***}	-1.513^{***}	-1.010^{**}	-1.150^{**}	-6.895^{***}	-7.597^{***}	-7.033^{***}	-3.137^{***}
	(0.395)	(0.422)	(0.393)	(0.419)	(0.473)	(0.488)	(1.965)	(2.226)	(1.981)	(0.723)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Department FE	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Year FE	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
	3122	2884	3122	2884	3122	2884	3122	2884	3122	2884
<i>Note</i> : Standard errors clustered by mun reported. The unit of analysis is the mu models with three lagged terms of the for event-count data. Unit-level fixed ei They are also omitted in models 7-8 b binomial estimators are preferred becat * $p < .1$, *** $p < .05$, **** $p < .01$	uicipality (moc micipality-ye dependent van ffects are omi because of the use conditiona	lels 1-4 and 9-1 ur. Models 1-2 i iable. Models ' tted in models 5 incidental para al maximum lik	0), panel corred include departn 7-8 are tobit rej 5-6 because OL umeter problem elihood approa	sted (models 5- nent fixed effec gression model S estimates are t, which yields ches for negati	6), and robust ets. Models 3- s for censored biased in mo biased and ir ve binomial a	White-Huber 4 include two- 1 data. Models dels with a lag consistent est re not true fixe	(models 7-8) in way random ef 9-10 are hybti ged dependent imates in tobit cd-effects mode	n parentheses. Fects. Models d, fixed-effect variable and fi models (Green els (Allison anc	Constants estir 5-6 include au s negative binc xed effects (Ni ne, 2004). Hy l Waterman, 2	nated but not to-regressive mial models ckell, 1981). orid negative 002).

Table A6: Alternative Base Regression Models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Commodity prices	0.725	-0.340	1.009^{***}	0.685^{*}	0.668	0.191	0.841^{**}	0.498
	(0.697)	(0.523)	(0.368)	(0.360)	(0.495)	(0.448)	(0.340)	(0.341)
Commodity prices × Land suitability	-0.828	0.036	-1.077^{***}	-0.984^{***}	-0.768	-0.533	-0.934^{***}	-0.795^{**}
	(0.757)	(0.597)	(0.390)	(0.380)	(0.522)	(0.492)	(0.360)	(0.368)
Commodity prices \times Settlements (1Q)	1.051	2.003^{**}						
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Settlements (1Q)	(0.812) -1.068	(0.809) -2.128**						
	(0.893)	(0.886)						
Commodity prices \times Settlements (3Q)			1.675^{*}	1.700^{*}				
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Settlements (3Q)			(0.910) -1.826^{*} (0.979)	(0.933) -1.854* (1.005)				
Commodity prices \times Committees (1Q)					1.826^{**}	1.516^{**}		
					(0.796)	(0.755)		
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Committees (1Q)					-1.915^{**}	-1.582*		
Community mires × Committees (30)					(600.0)	(070.0)	3 156**	7 A01**
$(\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{F}})$							0.120	(1.226)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Committees (3Q)							-3.374^{**}	-2.666^{*}
•							(1.372)	(1.368)
Controls	NO	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FF	Vac	Vac	Vac	Vac	Vac	Vac	Vac	Vac
ivium-ipanity i iz	V _{2.2}	V.	V ₂₂	V.c.	V.	Vo.	1C5 V ₂₂	N ₂₂
ICAL FE	15S 2100	155		105		155	105	100
	3122	2884	5122	2884	3010	2884	3010	7884
Adj. R-squared	-0.010	-0.009	-0.011	-0.013	0.0002	-0.010	0.010	-0.006
<i>Note</i> : Standard errors clustered by municipality in parenth 5-6 are estimated on municipalities whose levels of subsistence se estimated on municipalities whose levels of subsistence se settlements and peasant committees 2 and 8, and 0 and 5, 1 * $n < 1.1 * n < 05.4 * n < 01$	neses. Consta stence settlerr (ttlements and respectively.	nts estimated ients and peas peasant comi	but not report ant committe mittes are grea	ed. The unit o es are equal or tter than the 3r	f analysis is t : less than the d quantile. Tl	he municipali 1st quantile. 1st and 3rc	ity-year. Mod Models 3-4 i I quantiles of i	els 1-2 and and 7-8 are subsistence

Table A7: Alternative Cutoffs of Organizational Resources (1st and 3rd Quantiles)

(b) Peasant committees



Figure A12: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies. Based on models 1 and 5 (Table A7). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are equal or less than its 1st quantile. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are greater than its 1st quantile. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

(b) Peasant committees



Figure A13: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies. Based on models 3 and 7 (Table A7). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are equal or less than its 3rd quantile. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are greater than its 3rd quantile. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Commodity prices	0.226	-0.307	1.149***	0.793**
	(0.531)	(0.457)	(0.355)	(0.389)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-0.250	0.035	-1.252***	-1.114***
	(0.567)	(0.509)	(0.377)	(0.420)
Commodity prices \times Settlements	0.215***	0.239***		· · · ·
	(0.072)	(0.071)		
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Settlements	-0.228^{***}	-0.254^{***}		
	(0.077)	(0.075)		
Commodity prices \times Committees			0.066^{*}	0.051
			(0.034)	(0.059)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Committees			-0.071^{*}	-0.056
			(0.040)	(0.066)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	3122	2884	3010	2884
Adj. R-squared	-0.002	-0.002	0.0005	-0.015

Table A8: Discrete Measures of Organizational Resources

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. Subsistence settlements and peasant committees are measured as discrete count variables. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Commodity prices	0.291	-0.067	1.415***	1.047**
• •	(0.424)	(0.517)	(0.427)	(0.419)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-0.339	-0.243	-1.567***	-1.417***
	(0.446)	(0.585)	(0.463)	(0.450)
Commodity prices \times Hectares	1.745**	1.627**		
	(0.678)	(0.749)		
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Hectares	-1.833**	-1.715^{**}		
	(0.744)	(0.816)		
Commodity prices \times Members			1.262	0.814
			(1.009)	(0.945)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Members			-1.277	-0.793
			(1.081)	(1.008)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	3122	2884	2982	2884
Adj. R-squared	-0.005	-0.011	-0.011	-0.015

Table A9: Subsistence Hectares and Committee Members

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. Hectares is a dummy variable measuring whether the number of subsistence hectares is greater than the median. Members is a dummy variable measuring whether the number of peasant committees' members is greater than the median. The medians of hectares and members are 2599.43 and 0, respectively. The data for hectares and members come from Guyrá and Dávalos and Rodríguez (1994), respectively.

p < .1, p < .05, p < .01

(a) Subsistence hectares

(b) Committee members



Figure A14: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of subsistence agriculture (hectares) and organizational legacies (members). Based on models 1 and 3 (Table A9). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of subsistence hectares and committee members are equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of subsistence hectares and committee members are greater than its median value. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.



Figure A15: Binning estimates of the marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability. Based on model 1 (Table 1 of the paper). The histogram represents the distribution of municipalities at different levels of land suitability. Grey bands represent 95% confidence intervals. L, M, and H represent the 95% intervals for the marginal effects at the low, medium, and high terciles.

Table A10: Binning Estimates by Land Suitability

		Land suitability	
Bins	L: [0.695,0.853]	M: (0.853,0.924]	H: (0.924,0.968]
Estimate	0.209	0.08	-0.009
95% CI	[0.08,0.339]	[0.013,0.148]	[-0.072,0.054]
<i>p</i> -value	0.065	0.031	0.004
H_0	$\alpha_2 = \alpha_1$	$\alpha_3 = \alpha_2$	$\alpha_1 = \alpha_3$

Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance. Based on Figure A15. L, M, and H refer to the first, second, and third tercile of land suitability.

Table A11: Split-Sample Interactions

	\leq med(Settlements)		> med(Settlements)		< <i>med</i> (Committees)		> med(Committees)	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Commodity prices	0.631	-0.352	2.274***	2.456***	0.644	0.386	2.514***	1.715***
• •	(0.524)	(0.343)	(0.497)	(0.700)	(0.506)	(0.411)	(0.630)	(0.638)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-0.726	-0.045	-2.396***	-2.826***	-0.768	-0.696	-2.683***	-2.198***
	(0.553)	(0.354)	(0.542)	(0.790)	(0.523)	(0.474)	(0.696)	(0.713)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	1582	1414	1540	1470	1400	1372	1610	1512
Adi, R-squared	-0.036	-0.032	0.016	0.014	-0.058	-0.037	0.030	0.023

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. Models 1-2 and 5-6 are estimated on municipalities whose levels of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are equal or less than the median. Models 3-4 and 7-8 are estimated on municipalities whose levels of subsistence settlements and local peasant committees are greater than the median. The medians of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are 4 and 1, respectively. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01



Figure A16: Binning estimates of the marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies. Based on models 1, 3, 5, and 7 (Table A11). Panel (a) and (c) include municipalities whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees is equal or less than its median value. Panel (b) and (d) include municipalities whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees is greater than the its median value. The histograms represent the distribution of observations at different levels of land suitability. Grey bands represent 95% confidence intervals. L, M, and H represent the 95% intervals for the marginal effects at the low, medium, and high terciles.

		Land Suitability	
(a)	≤ <i>med</i> (Settlements)		
Bins	L: [0.695,0.852]	M: (0.852,0.904]	H: (0.904,0.965]
Estimate	0.143	0.082	-0.005
95% CI	[-0.046,0.332]	[0.012,0.152]	[-0.111,0.102]
<i>p</i> -value	0.534	0.125	0.182
H_0	$\alpha_2 = \alpha_1$	$\alpha_3 = \alpha_2$	$\alpha_1 = \alpha_3$
(b)	> med(Settlements)		
Bins	L: [0.697,0.854]	M: (0.854,0.94]	H: (0.94,0.968]
Estimate	0.365	0.034	-0.023
95% CI	[0.161,0.569]	[-0.032,0.099]	[-0.107,0.061]
<i>p</i> -value	0.002	0.164	0.001
H_0	$\alpha_2 = \alpha_1$	$\alpha_3 = \alpha_2$	$\alpha_1 = \alpha_3$

Table A12: Binning Estimates by Land Suitability and Subsistence Agriculture

Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance. Based on Figure A16. L, M, and H refer to the first, second, and third tercile of land suitability.

		Land Suitability	
(a)	≤ <i>med</i> (Committees)		
Bins	L: [0.7,0.86]	M: (0.86,0.939]	H: (0.939,0.968]
Estimate	0.078	0.022	-0.011
95% CI	[-0.085,0.242]	[-0.028,0.072]	[-0.078,0.057]
<i>p</i> -value	0.493	0.321	0.317
H_0	$\alpha_2 = \alpha_1$	$\alpha_3 = \alpha_2$	$\alpha_1 = \alpha_3$
(b)	> <i>med</i> (Committees)		
Bins	L: [0.695,0.851]	M: (0.851,0.911]	H: (0.911,0.966]
Estimate	0.309	0.203	-0.015
95% CI	[0.113,0.505]	[0.073,0.333]	[-0.133,0.104]
<i>p</i> -value	0.334	0.012	0.010
H_0	$\alpha_2 = \alpha_1$	$\alpha_3 = \alpha_2$	$\alpha_1 = \alpha_3$

Table A13: Binning Estimates by Land Suitability and Organizational Legacies

Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance. Based on Figure A16, L, M, and H refer to the first, second, and third tercile of land suitability.

A3 Placebo Tests

Table A14: Peasant Resistance to Low Income.

Figure A17: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance to low income by land suitability.

Figure A18: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance to low income by land suitability for municipalities with and without subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies.

Table A15: Conflicts between Peasants and Indigenous Peoples.

Figure A19: Marginal effect of commodity prices on conflicts between peasants and indigenous peoples by land suitability.

Figure A20: Marginal effect of commodity prices on conflicts between peasants and indigenous peoples by land suitability for municipalities with and without subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies.

Table A16: Conflicts between Landowners and the State.

Figure A21: Marginal effect of commodity prices on conflicts between landowners and the state by land suitability.

Figure A22: Marginal effect of commodity prices on conflicts between landowners and the state by land suitability for municipalities with and without subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies.

Table A17: Commodity Prices and Land Suitability of Cotton, Tobacco, and Yerba Mate.

Figure A23: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability (cotton, tobacco, and yerba mate).

Figure A24: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability (cotton, tobacco, and yerba mate) for municipalities with and without subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies.

Table A18: Peasant Cotton Farming.

Figure A25: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with and without cotton farming.

Table A19: Legacies of IBR Colonization.

Figure A26: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with and without legacies of IBR colonization.

Table A20: Landowner Associations.

Figure A27: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with and without landowner associations.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Commodity prices	0.022	0.077	-0.017	0.243	0.132	0.175
	(0.141)	(0.169)	(0.193)	(0.198)	(0.089)	(0.133)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	0.035	-0.057	0.096	-0.210	-0.058	-0.135
	(0.161)	(0.181)	(0.223)	(0.224)	(0.099)	(0.128)
Commodity prices \times Settlements			0.019	-0.319		
• •			(0.283)	(0.356)		
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Settlements			-0.055	0.315		
			(0.324)	(0.404)		
Commodity prices \times Committees					-0.223	-0.092
• •					(0.322)	(0.298)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Committees					0.199	0.052
					(0.373)	(0.344)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3122	2884	3122	2884	3010	2884
Adj. R-squared	-0.048	-0.049	-0.047	-0.047	-0.044	-0.047

Table A14: Peasant Resistance to Low Income

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. The dependent variable are all the events of peasant resistance to low rural incomes (e.g, low wages or insufficient rural credit). The data for peasant resistance to low rural incomes come from the authors' archival database. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01



Figure A17: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance (to low income) by land suitability. Based on model 1 (Table A14). The histogram represents the distribution of municipalities at different levels of land suitability. Red bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

(b) Peasant committees



Figure A18: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance (to low income) by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies. Based on models 3 and 5 (Table A14). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are greater than its median value. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Commodity prices	0.212	0.168	0.376	0.381	0.154*	-0.003
	(0.138)	(0.132)	(0.269)	(0.319)	(0.086)	(0.103)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-0.205	-0.230	-0.401	-0.476	-0.142	-0.052
	(0.146)	(0.153)	(0.296)	(0.364)	(0.087)	(0.091)
Commodity prices \times Settlements			-0.282	-0.367		
			(0.271)	(0.364)		
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Settlements			0.336	0.431		
			(0.302)	(0.406)		
Commodity prices \times Committees					0.185	0.298
					(0.301)	(0.332)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Committees					-0.200	-0.322
					(0.334)	(0.367)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	3122	2884	3122	2884	3010	2884
Adj. R-squared	-0.068	-0.063	-0.065	-0.058	-0.066	-0.060

Table A15: Conflicts between Peasants and Indigenous Peoples

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. The dependent variable are all the events of conflict between peasants and indigenous peoples (e.g., demarcation of boundaries). The data for conflicts between peasants and indigenous peoples come from the authors' archival database. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01



Figure A19: Marginal effect of commodity prices on conflicts between peasants and indigenous peoples by land suitability. Based on model 1 (Table A15). The histogram represents the distribution of municipalities at different levels of land suitability. Red bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

(b) Peasant committees



Figure A20: Marginal effect of commodity prices on conflicts between peasants and indigenous peoples by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies. Based on models 3 and 5 (Table A15). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are equal or less than its median value. Municipalities are greater than its median value. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Commodity prices	0.103	0.173*	0.021	0.161	0.110*	0.056
	(0.113)	(0.093)	(0.175)	(0.112)	(0.064)	(0.085)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-0.118	-0.215^{**}	-0.036	-0.219^{*}	-0.126^{*}	-0.089
•••	(0.128)	(0.108)	(0.200)	(0.120)	(0.071)	(0.086)
Commodity prices \times Settlements			0.196	0.036		
			(0.234)	(0.214)		
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Settlements			-0.197	-0.015		
•••			(0.261)	(0.236)		
Commodity prices \times Committees					0.191	0.219
• •					(0.188)	(0.202)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Committees					-0.214	-0.245
					(0.210)	(0.225)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3122	2884	3122	2884	3010	2884
Adj. R-squared	-0.041	-0.024	-0.039	-0.023	-0.035	-0.024

Table A16: Conflicts between Landowners and the State

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. The dependent variable are all the events of conflict between landowners and the state (e.g., roadblocks demanding lower taxes or lower gas prices). The data for conflicts between landowners and the state come from the authors' archival database. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01



Figure A21: Marginal effect of commodity prices on conflicts between landowners and the state by land suitability. Based on model 1 (Table A16). The histogram represents the distribution of municipalities at different levels of land suitability. Red bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

(b) Peasant committees



Figure A22: Marginal effect of commodity prices on conflicts between landowners and the state by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies. Based on models 3 and 5 (Table A16). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are greater than its median value. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

Table A17: Commodity Prices and Land Suitability of Cotton, Tobacco, and Yerba Mate

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Commodity prices	-0.680	-0.589	-0.873	-0.790	-0.694	-0.601
• •	(0.682)	(0.711)	(0.653)	(0.672)	(0.699)	(0.736)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-0.211	-0.297^{*}	0.184	0.117	-0.136	-0.274
	(0.157)	(0.161)	(0.166)	(0.152)	(0.214)	(0.207)
Commodity prices \times Settlements			0.880***	0.900***		
• •			(0.281)	(0.297)		
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Settlements			-0.930***	-0.928***		
			(0.310)	(0.326)		
Commodity prices \times Committees					0.126	0.033
• •					(0.308)	(0.327)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Committees					-0.105	-0.026
					(0.346)	(0.369)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	3122	2884	3122	2884	3010	2884
Adj. R-squared	-0.025	-0.024	-0.019	-0.017	-0.025	-0.025

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. Commodity prices is the IHS of Paraguay's average producer price of cotton, tobacco, and yerba mate, in U.S. dollars per metric ton. Land suitability is the IHS of Paraguay's average potential yield for cotton, tobacco, and yerba mate, in metric tons per hectare. The data for prices and suitability come from FAOSTAT and GAEZ, respectively. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01



Figure A23: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability (cotton, tobacco, and yerba mate). Based on model 1 A17. The histogram represents the distribution of municipalities at different levels of land suitability. Red bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

(b) Peasant committees



Figure A24: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability (cotton, tobacco, and yerba mate) for municipalities with low and high levels of subsistence agriculture and organizational legacies. Based on models 3 and 5 (Table A17). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of subsistence settlements and peasant committees are greater than its median value. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

	Model 1	Model 2
Commodity prices	1.077***	0.780**
	(0.316)	(0.375)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-1.120^{***}	-1.117^{***}
	(0.339)	(0.395)
Commodity prices \times Cotton farms	1.803	1.783
	(1.616)	(1.792)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Cotton farms	-2.054	-2.033
	(1.755)	(1.942)
Controls	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
N	3010	2786
Adj. R-squared	-0.009	-0.012

Table A18: Peasant Cotton Farming

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. Cotton farms is a dummy variable measuring whether the number of small farms (5 hectares or less) planting cotton is greater than the median. The data for cotton farms come from the 1991 agricultural census.

 $p^* p < .1, p^* < .05, p^* < .01$



Figure A25: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of peasant cotton farming. Based on model 1 (Table A18). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of peasant cotton farms are equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of peasant cotton farms are greater than its median value. The histogram represents the distribution of municipalities at different levels of land suitability. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

	Model 1	Model 2
Commodity prices	1.036***	0.769**
	(0.400)	(0.377)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-1.126***	-1.097^{**}
	(0.423)	(0.432)
Commodity prices \times IBR colonies	1.082	0.896
	(0.800)	(0.826)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times IBR colonies	-1.153	-0.939
	(0.868)	(0.896)
Controls	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Ν	3122	2884
Adj. R-squared	-0.012	-0.015

Table A19: Legacies of IBR Colonization

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. IBR colonies is a dummy variable measuring whether the number of peasant colonies founded by the IBR in 1963-1989 is greater than the median. The data for IBR colonies come from Rojas and Areco (2017).

 $p^* p^* < .1, p^* < .05, p^* < .01$



Figure A26: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of IBR colonization legacies. Based on model 1 (Table A19). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of IBR peasant colonies are equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of IBR peasant colonies are greater than its median value. The histogram represents the distribution of municipalities at different levels of land suitability. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

	Model 1	Model 2
Commodity prices	1.205**	0.758
	(0.508)	(0.514)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability	-1.311^{**}	-1.080^{*}
	(0.550)	(0.552)
Commodity prices \times Landowner assoc.	0.367	1.107
	(0.692)	(0.818)
Commodity prices \times Land suitability \times Landowner assoc.	-0.350	-1.169
	(0.759)	(0.897)
Controls	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Ν	3122	2884
Adj. R-squared	-0.014	-0.015

Table A20: Landowner Associations

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. Landowner associations is a dummy variable measuring whether the number of landowner associations affiliated with the ARP or UGP is greater than the median. The data for landowner associations come from the ARP and UGP's list of affiliates and district offices. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01



Figure A27: Marginal effect of commodity prices on peasant resistance by land suitability for municipalities with low and high levels of landowner association. Based on model 1 (Table A20). Municipalities with low levels are those whose number of landowner associations are equal or less than its median value. Municipalities with high levels are those whose number of landowner associations are greater than its median value. The histogram represents the distribution of municipalities at different levels of land suitability. Red and blue bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

A4 Extensions

Table A21: Differences in Planted Hectares from 1991 to 2008.

Table A22: Base Results by Agricultural Commodity.

Figure A28: Marginal effect of the price of each agricultural commodity on peasant resistance by land suitability.

	Total	Soybeans	Maize	Rice	Sugar
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Land suitability	-37.521*** (10.695)				
Soybean suitability		-31.814*** (8.994)			
Maize suitability			-5.648 (6.237)		
Rice suitability				-16.736^{**} (7.052)	
Sugar suitability				()	-1.493 (23.727)
Department FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	No	No	No	No
Ν	202	202	202	202	202

Table A21: Differences in Planted Hectares from 1991 to 2008

Note: Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. Constants estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality. All models are OLS regressions with department fixed effects. The data for differences in planted hectares come from the 2008 and 1991 agricultural censuses.

p < .1, p < .05, p < .01

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Soybean price	0.768***	0.545*						
	(0.253)	(0.297)						
Maize price			0.552***	0.173				
			(0.142)	(0.201)				
Rice price					-0.190	-0.942		
					(0.653)	(0.954)		
Sugar price							0.171	0.438
							(0.225)	(0.683)
Soybean price \times Soybean suitability	-0.800^{***}	-0.895^{***}						
	(0.280)	(0.293)						
Maize price \times Maize suitability			-0.541^{***}	-0.496^{***}				
· ·			(0.138)	(0.150)				
Rice price \times Rice suitability					0.298	0.685		
					(0.722)	(1.032)		
Sugar price \times Sugar suitability					. ,	. ,	-0.133	-0.720
							(0.246)	(0.744)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ν	3122	2884	3122	2884	3122	2884	3122	2884
Adj. R-squared	-0.021	-0.018	-0.017	-0.020	-0.028	-0.027	-0.028	-0.027

Table A22: Base Results by Agricultural Commodity

Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Constants and controls estimated but not reported. The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01



(a) Soybeans

(b) Maize

Figure A28: Marginal effect of the price of each agricultural commodity on peasant resistance by land suitability. Based on models 1, 3, 5, and 7 (Table A22). The histogram represents the distribution of municipalities at different levels of land suitability. Red bands represent 95% confidence intervals.

A5 Additional Information on Interviews

Our qualitative research comprises 35 semi-structured interviews in the cities of Asunción, Lambaré, Luque, and San Lorenzo conducted in different months between 2014-2020. These include in-depth conversations with leaders from peasant federations, referents from NGOs and scholarly institutions, former and current high-ranking national officials, and officers from farmers' organizations and agribusiness firms. Additionally, we conducted extensive archival work at the repositories of the two main research programs on rural conflict, the *Centro de Documentación y Estudios* (CDE) and *Base Investigaciones Sociales* (BASE-IS). These programs provided us with a collection of secondary sources that offers rich descriptions of the contentious episodes analyzed in this paper.

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