Refer to my CV for a full list of publications.
Mangonnet, J. and Murillo, M. V. 2019. Protests of Abundance: Distributive Conflict over Agricultural Rents during the Commodities Boom in Argentina, 2003-2013. Forthcoming at Comparative Political Studies.
draft | appendix | active citations
Mangonnet, J., Murillo, M. V, and J. M. Rubio. 2018. Local Economic Voting and the Agricultural Boom in Argentina, 2007-2015. Latin American Politics and Society 60(8), 27–53.
article | appendix | replication data
Arce, M. and Mangonnet, J. 2013. Competitiveness, Partisanship, and Subnational Protest in Argentina. Comparative Political Studies 46(8), 895–919.
Kopas, J., Mangonnet, J., and J. Urpelainen. Playing Politics with Environmental Protection: The Political Economy of Designating Protected Areas in Brazil (Revise and resubmit).
article | appendix (e-mail for the last version)
Mangonnet, J. Property Formation in Weak States: Theory and Evidence from Imperial Brazil (dissertation chapter).
abstract (e-mail for a draft)Local elites are assumed to resist state attempts at reforming property regimes out of fear of disempowerment. I propose a theory to explain why traditional authorities might support, and comply with, state-backed land tenure systems in contexts of limited administrative capacity. In the absence of restrictions on the customary use of land, I argue that a disruption to forced labor arrangements encourages elites to promote an exclusionary property order that invalidates workers' claims, reduces mobility, and facilitates the transition to cheap wage labor. I test this theory in Imperial Brazil, where the end of the Atlantic slave trade led southeastern planters to support the Land Law of 1850. Using a novel hand-collected geocoded data set, I show that planters in parishes with more slaves voluntarily shifted their landholdings to freehold tenure to subsidize the arrival of poor immigrant workers. I also show that individual parliamentarians who were slaveowners voted favorably for the Land Law as it denied the possession claims of the rural poor. These findings reveal that property formation in weak states is the result of a co-production effort between local and central interests and not of unilateral state action
Duarte, R., Feierherd, G., Mangonnet, J., and M. V. Murillo. Rural Resistance in Times of Affluence: Land Conflict during the Paraguayan Soybean Boom.
abstract (e-mail for a draft)This paper investigates rural conflict between peasants and landowners in Paraguay in the past two decades in order to understand the conditions under which landed elites dispossess peasant populations of the lands they inhabit, a phenomenon that has gained salience in the past two decades. Conventional explanations underscore the incidence of the 2000s commodities boom that made increase the value of land for commercial production. We examine here the relative weight of those economic incentives vis-á-vis political factors. In particular, we explore whether conflicts are more likely to emerge depending on electoral incentives associated to the party of the mayor and its alignment with the national government as well as local organizations that increase the capacity of collective actions of both actors. Furthermore, we explore the protest repertoires used by resisting peasants and compare those with the contentious tools of farmers in their conflict with the state seeking to not only explain the patterns of conflict occurrences but also its different forms of expression
Mangonnet, J. Maps of Illegibility: The Politics of Land (Mis)Registration in Brazil.
abstract (e-mail for a draft)Property rights in land must be simplified in deeds, conveyances, or maps to be exercised. Yet, landowners sometimes conceal or adulterate documentary evidence of ownership. I contend that landowners will prefer to make their landholdings "illegible" when the government signals a deleterious use of that information. I provide microlevel evidence of this logic by drawing on a rich database of federal cadastral audits from Brazil in 2000-2006. Results from a regression discontinuity design show that individual landowners selected into a mandatory regularization program were less likely to report accurate details of their estates, including geographic coordinates and soil productivity, to the cadastral agency in municipalities where there had been expropriations for land reform. I also find that landowners with ties to the Rural Democratic Union, a conservative league of ranchers, were prone to withheld cadastral records or declare apocryphal information. These results show how local nonstate elites partake in repertoires of quiet resistance against state-building endeavors. They also have implications for theories of capital mobility, redistribution, and land formalization in developing nations, as the political environment in which these systems operate critically shapes how records could be utilized.
Mangonnet, J. Crafting Property Rights in Abundant Resources: Labor Shocks and Elite Bargains in Imperial Brazil (dissertation chapter).
Bandiera, A., Larreguy, H., and J. Mangonnet. Building Supporting Coalitions in Weak Autocracies: Evidence from Family Networks and Illegal Land Allocations in Paraguay, 1954-2003.
Bandiera, A., Larreguy, H., and J. Mangonnet. Do Property Rights Lead to More Engaged Citizens? Evidence from Land Lotteries in Argentina.
Mangonnet, J. and M. Moseley. Clientelism and Protest Buying in Argentina.
Mangonnet, J., Oré Quispe, S., and M. Sviatschi. Do Criminal Incumbents Promote Illicit Markets? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design in Peru.